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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DJ\VID W. HEATH and
SUSAN N. HEATH,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
Case No. 16029

vs.
DONALD A. MOWER and FUTURE
C0i'll!UNITY HOMES OF UTAH,
INC., a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Respondents, David W. Heath and Susan M.
!Ieath, sued the defendants for breach of contract and
for fraudulent misrepresentation.
DISPOSITION IN TilE LOWER COURT
The Honorable J. Duffy Palmer entered a default
jud0ment and took evidence with respect to the issues
of fraud and the personal liability of the defendant
Donald A. Mower after a pretrial hearing on the 20th
day of April, 1978, wherein the defendants failed to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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appear either in person or by counsel.

Appellants' sub-

sequent motion to set aside the default judgment in the
sum of $13,241.95, including interest and court costs,
was denied by Judge Palmer.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the court's order denying
the motion to set aside the default judgment sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent adopts by reference the statement of
facts set forth in the appellant's brief with the
following exceptions:
The statement of appellant Mower in his affidavit
that he did not receive notice of a hearing bears careful scrutiny in light of other facts, to wit:

The

amended notice of withdrawal of counsel contained a
mailing certificate dated March 2, 1978, and there is
no evidence that said mail was returned.

Further, the

pretrial notice was not only mailed to William H.
Henderson but also to the defendant, Donald A. Mower
(R.-78, 79).

The mailgram upon which appellant relies

so heavily lists his home address (R.-84), which is
the same address to which the amended notice of withdrawal was mailed (R.-80), and the same address to
which the notice of pretrial was mailed on the 17th day
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of March, 1978

(R.-79), and the same address to which

counsel for repondent sent a letter certified mail,
return receipt requested on the 13th day of March, 1978
(R.-83, Exh. A).
Further, defendant's affidavit is replete with
other contradictions, for example:

In the first full

paragraph on Page 3 of appellant's brief, he represents that he first learned of the pretrial in a telephone conversation with his wife on April 19th, but
Paragraph 8 of his affidavit represents that this took
place on April 18, 1978, giving him another full day in
which to make contact with the court (R.-96).

At the

pretrial on April 20, 1978, the court clerk, Mrs.
Barbara Unsworth, stated unequivocally to the court
that her mailing of the notice of pretrial to the defcnaant was not returned to the court clerk's office.
Appellant states that the mailgram was received by the
court on April 20, 1978, but not filed until the 24th
day of April

(appellant's brief, P. 3), but the minute

entry contains a reference to the effect that no contact has been made by Mr. Mower, and the court finds
him in default (R.-81), and there is no evidence otherwise.
Next,

in Paragraph 9 of the affidavit (R.-96),
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appellant represents that in the mailgram he stated
that he had received no notice of the hearing and that
he did not have time to retain another attorney or to
prepare for the hearing.
(R.-84)

One reading of the mailgram

shows that both allegations are false.

There

Has no mention of lack of notice or that he did not have
time to retain an attorney.
Next, in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of his affidavit (R.-95),
appellant avers that one of the notices was returned unclaimed, and blandly states that no notice of the pretrial was ever received by him.

He doesn't even attempt

to explain why he did not claim the certified mail pursuant to the two notices delivered to him by the post
office on March 18, 1978, and again on March 23, 1978.
There is a difference in the notice of pretrial contained
in the certified mail, Exhibit A, and the notice of
pretrial sent by the court clerk.

Note specifically the

addition of the defendants' names to the certificate of
mailing and the date of that certificate after the clerk
received the amended notice of withdrawal of counsel containing defendant Mower's address, which was filed with
the court on Harch 10, 1978, two days after the original
notices were mailed, showing a specific effort on the
part of the court clerk to notify the defendants, advising
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Machine-generated -4OCR, may contain errors.

them to be present and represented by counsel ·if they so
desired, and said notices were mailed a month before the
pretrial was held, and defendant's former wife appeared
and testified pursuant to that notice.
Next, in his affidavit the appellant claims that he
first learned of the pretrial hearing on April 18, 1978,
through a telephone conversation with his former wife.
But her testimony given at the trial shows that she had
conversations with him about the pretrial long before
the 18th day of April, 1978.
Finally, appellant represents at the beginning of
the second full paragraph on Page 2 of his brief that
the default judgment first taken by respondent was set
aside by the court "because of the failure to serve the
appellants", and the statement is not factual.

The

record shows at Page 16-20 and 26-29 that appellant and
his attorney at that time alleged as one of the grounds
for setting aside the default judgment that appellant
had not been properly served with process.

After lengthy

argument about jurisdiction of the court in Davis County
and a representation of a defense and counterclaim,
plaintiff stipulated to waive the default and allow the
defendant to file his answer and plead his counterclaim,
but defendant did nothing more until he was forced into
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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discovery by action of the plaintiff, and then defendant
refused to complete the discovery as agreed at the deposition by furnishing additional materials to his attorney
for inclusion in the deposition and failing to sign and
file the deposition (R.-9lA, No. 7).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT UNDER
(l) _1\.ND (7) OF RULE 60(b}, U.R.C.P.
Rule 60 (b) (l} and (7)

states:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or its legal representative from the
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:
(l) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect ... (7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment.
Appellent's mailgram (R.-84) and affidavit (R.-95,96)
do not support the relief requested.

The mailgram is

completely void of any suggestion that appellant was
taken by surprise or that there was any mistake in his
conception of the court procedure, or that there was any
inadvertence or excusable neglect.
for itself:

The document speaks

"WILL BE UNABLE TO ATTEND THE MEETING AT

YOUR OFFICE TODAY.

AM ATTEflPTING TO FIND LOCAL ATTORNEY

TO HANDLE THIS MATTER FOR ME."

No reason is given as to

why he is unable to attend or why he will not have an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attorney.

Mr. Henderson's withdrawal may well have

been unexpected, but defendant was in Salt Lake City
between the 20th day of March and the 20th day of April
and was well aware of the pretrial conference.

It is

inconceivable that the defendant can allege mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect when he
didn't even pick up certified mail after two notices
from the post office.

He doesn't allege that he was out

of town at the time or that the mail got burned along
with old bills, he doesn't make any explanation for
failing to pick up the notice that showed that his
attorney had withdrawn and gave the date of the pretrial.

He doesn't even say that he didn't get notice

from the post office that the letter was there.

He

simply states that the letter was returned unclaimed
and implies that he therefore has no responsibility for
the information contained therein.

In Warren v. Dixon

Ranch Company, 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), the
court said at Page 743:
Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of
justice, and the court will incline toward
granting relief in a doubtful case to the end
that the party may have a hearing ... however,
the movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing
by circumstances over which he had no control.
(emphasis added)
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And at Page 744, the court said:
In order for this court to overturn the discretion
of the lower court in refusing to vacate a valid
judgment, the requirements of public policy demand
more than a mere statement that a person did not
have his day in court when full opportunity for
a fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal
representative.
The exact same language was adopted by the court in
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65,
513 P.2d 429 (1973, and the court confirmed again the
same language in State v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 1375
(Utah 1977).
Appellant didn't even attempt to make contact with
respondent or respondent's attorney even on the 18th day
of April or the 19th, or the morning of the 20th, and
the address of respondent's counsel was known to appellant and was on the notice of pretrial.

The notice of

pretrial mailed by the clerk on the 17th day of March
1978, specifically done to give appellant the notice he
claims he was entitled to receive, was never returned
to the clerk's office.

The courts of this state have

accorded to the U.S. mail sufficient reliability to provide for service by mail, and under Rule 5(b)(l), it
states:
( 1)
l'lhenever under these rules service is
required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney, the service shall
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be made upon the attorney unless service upon
the party himself is ordered by the court.
Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall
be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or, if no
address is known, by leaving it with the clerk
of the court ... service by mail is complete
upon mailing.
The clerk of the court made a specific effort to
mail notice of the pretrial to defendant and certified
that she did so.

Appellant doesn't say in his affidavit

that he didn't get the clerk's mail, he simply says that
he didn't get the kind of notice that was in the certified letter, and that's true.

The clerk's notice was

much more explicit and contained directives which the
defendant ignored.

Paragraph 6 of appellant's affidavit

is very much like Paragraph 2 of his first affidavit
made to avoid service of process upon him (R.-16, No. 2).
Appellant there said:

"That there was never served upon

affiant a copy of the summons in this action, and the
first time affiant heard of said action was about
January 9, 1976, by his attorney".

But the record at

Pages 9 and 10 show a summons and a constable's return
under oath showing personal service upon the defendant,
so it doesn't really matter whether you serve appellant
personally or by mail, he just doesn't ever get served
when he doesn't want to be.

The court was perfectly

justified in believing that lightning does not strike
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twice in the same spot and that under all of the circumstances and especially appellant's unexplained failure to even pick up his certified mail, appellant's
representations were not believable.
The court stated in Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah
2d 415, 303 P.2d 995 (1956) cited also in appellant's
brief, at Page 996:
At the hearing upon the motion to set aside
the judgment, neither plaintiff nor his Nevada
attorney appeared for cross-examination upon
the facts alleged in their affidavits.
His
appeal seems to proceed upon the assumption
that the court was obliged to accept them as
true, which is not the case. Apparently the
court was not convinced that the plaintiff had
any justifiable excuse for not appearing at
the trial, nor that he at the time in good
faith desired to pursue the Utah action.
And at Page 997, the court said:
A prime requisite precedent to the granting of
such relief is that the movant demonstrate that
he comes to the court with clean hands and in
good faith.
His entire conduct as disclosed by
the record negates this.
Appellant's affidavit and mailgram show no "other"
reason for setting aside the default and judgment upon
which appellant can rely.

Nowhere in his affidavit docs

he say that he was not informed that his attorney had
withdrawn, yet it is obvious from his rnailgr.Jm that he
did know that he was not represented by counsel.

He

could get that information from any one of the three
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mailings that were mailed to him by his former attorney,
the court clerk, and opposing counsel, one of which was
certified, and the very latest of those notices would
have been received March 20, 1978, and all of the notices
were addressed to his self-proclaimed address listed on
the mailgram.

The statement of the defendant that he

received no notice of the hearing doesn't even apply to
the matter of notice that his attorney had withdrawn,
and he gives no explanation or reason for not taking
steps to employ other counsel.

He simply stated in the

mailgram that he was attempting to employ local counsel,
but for how long he was attempting to employ local counsel he does not say, and it is what the defendant does
not say that is so important here, because he has the
duty of convincing the court that setting aside the
default would be "in the furtherance of justice".

Snow

v. District Court in and for the City and County of
Denver, Second Judicial District, 572 P.2d 475 (Colo.
1977).

Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545

P.2d 507 (Utah 1976).
The position of the respondent is worthy of some
consideration in the determination of justice.

It has

been approximately 3-1/2 years since the parties contracted and respondent or his agents delivered money to
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appellant solely and only because of the representations
appellant made.

!low much longer must respondent keep

track of his witnesses and encourage them to keep their
memories sharp and their recollections bright with respect
to the incidents and conversations to meet the standard
of proof necessary for fraud.

How does respondent

justify the expenditures necessary for depositions of
each witness to preserve their testimony against fading
recoll0ction due to age, removal from the State of
Utah, and apathy, v1hen the probability that respondent
will ever receive payment is slim at best.
In American Savings & Loan Assn. v. Pierce, 28 Utah
2d 76, 498 P.2d 648 (1972), the court said at Page 648:
The main thrust of Christensen's appeal is that relief
should have been granted by vacating the judgment
on the ground of excusable neglect.
The record
does not reveal any excusable neglect of any kind.
Contrarywise, it reveals not only irresponsible
neglect, but a flaunting of procedural rules beyond judicial repair, repeated refusals to adhere
to the discovery procedures, rendering suspect a
disposition for unwarranted protraction and prosecution of the judicial process.
In Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52,
376 P.2d 951 (1962) cited in appellant's brief at Pages
10 and ll, the court set up two basic criteria for setting aside a default judgment, to wit:

Reasonable

justification or excuse and timely application to set
it aside.

The record is devoid of any reasonable excuse.
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Appellant says on Page 7 of his brief that he was
attending to business, as was the appellant in the
Trumbo case, but he neglects to tell us what business
he was attending to and why that business prevented him
from receiving one of three notices sent to him.

In

Airkem Intermountain,·· Inc. v. Parker, supra, the court
stated at Page 431:
The trial court must balance two valid considerations; on the one hand, to relieve the party
of the judgment vitiates the effect of res
judicata and creates a hardship for the successful litigant by causing him to prosecute more
than once his action and subjecting him to the
possible loss of collecting his judgment. On
the other hand, the court desires to protect
the losing party who has-not had the· opportunity
to present his claim or defense. The rule that
the courts will incline toward granting relief
to a party who has not had the opportunity to
present his case, is ordinarily applied at the
trial court level, and this court will not
reverse the determination of the trial court
merely because the .motion could have been granted.
(emphasis added)
POINT II
THE REQUIREHENTS OF RULE 2.5 OF THE RULES OF
PRACTICE WERE 11ET, AND SAID POINT HAS NOT
RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL.
The motion to set aside the judgment is based only
upon Rules 60 (b) (1),

(3), and (7) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure (R.-97).

Appellant's brief makes refer-

ence only to subsections (1) and (7), and subsection
(3)

has therefore been abandoned by appellant.

Neither
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in the motion nor in arguments did appellant give the
trial court an opportunity to weigh the effect of Rule
2.5 of the Rules of Practice, and the court should not
consider that issue for the first time on appeal.
General Appliance Corp. v. Haw, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 238,
516 P.2d 346 (1973); Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601
(Utah - 1978).
A discussion between the court and counsel for

respondent, led to the insertion of that notice in the
notice of pretrial mailed by the court under date of
March 17, 1978, because the certified letter sent by
counsel for respondent had already been mailed on
March 13, 1978.
Inasmuch as the letter from the court clerk addressed to appellant at his admitted address was not
returned, service is completed, and said defendant
was given the notice contemplated under Rule 2.5.

It

is interesting to note that appellant complained that
the provisions of Rule 2.5 were not met, while at the
same time it is patently obvious from his mailgram that
he knew what his responsibility was; and even more
important, had the certified letter contained more
specific notice he wouldn't have received it anyway,
because he didn't bother to pick up the certified mail.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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CONCLUSION
~he

total and only conclusion that can fairly be

reached is that there's no way to serve the appellant
if he doesn't want to be served.

You can't serve him

by personal service because he denies by affidavit that
he was so served.

You can't serve him by regular mail

because he denies that he received the regular mail.
You can't serve him by certified mail because he won't
go pick it up, and appellant then wants to place the
burden for lack of notice on counsel for respondent.
The trial court had a perfect right to believe the testimony of Mrs. Mower and that appellant's affidavit was
neither accurate nor truthful and that appellant in fact
received the notice sent by the clerk and the notice
sent by his former attorney in sufficient time to require
his attendance or representation at the pretrial, and
that having already had two bites at the apple through
a contradictory affidavit, appellant was not entitled to
a third.
Appellant did not want to spend the time or the
money to defend this action if the judgment was simply
against the corporation, and he gambled that there
1vould be no personal judgment against him and simply
hedged his bet with a mailgram.

When he found out that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-15Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the judgment was against him personally as well as the
corporation, he then decided to make his appearance
through counsel and contest the validity of the judgment.
Respectfully submitted this

~day

of December,

1978.

BlEAN

:RAN '

-SMEDL~Y(

-~~c/~C~z~

DAIID E. BEAN
'
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
.
I certl. f y that on thls

1:/;yt;
'I__:.--·d ay o f December, 197 8 ,

I served David R. Ward, appellant's attorney of record,
with two copies of respondent's brief by delivery at his
office, 455 South 300 East, Suite 201, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111.
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